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A Quiet Revolution in the 
Administration of Justice 
Peter H. Russell and Garry D. Watson* 
On the 28th of October, 1976, the Attorney General of Ontario, Honour-
able Roy McMurty, released a White Paper on Courts Administration. 
Compared with his Family Law proposals, the Courts Administration pro-
posals have received but scant attention in the press (a press which in th~ 
past few years has written extensively on the inadequacies of court admin-
istration in the province). While proposals concerning family law perhaps 
touch more immediate public interests, the new system of court administra-
tion set out in the White Paper could be at least as important in the long-run 
as it portends a significant reform in our system of government. 
The nub of the Courts Administration proposals is to transfer formal 
responsibility for running the entire Ontario court system from the Attor-
ney General's Department to a judicial council-a committee composed 
entirely of judges with the Chief Justice of Ontario, the chairman. If and 
when the proposal becomes law, the staff in the Ministry of the Attorney 
General currently engaged in court administration will be transferred to a 
newly established Office of Courts Administration headed by the Judicial 
Council. 
This proposal is an innovative solution to the Canadian version of a 
difficulty in the working of liberal-democratic government which in mod-
ern times has become apparent throughout the English-speaking world. 
The problem is how to arrange for the provision of an efficient adjudicative 
service which is accountable for its efficiency to the public it serves-
without fatally undermining the independence of the judges who must de-
liver that service. 
The problem has become apparent in recent years because the proli-
feration of laws and growth of litigation have produced much larger and 
more complex judicial machinery. As a result, the high price of inefficient 
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court administration-incessant delays and increasing costs of litigation to 
individuals, corporations and government-has come to be felt much more 
acutely. Witness the enormous spate of newspaper articles on delays and 
backlogs in the courts. 
In the late 1960's, the Ontario Government began to move on the 
problem by centralizing financial responsibility for courts at the provincial 
level, relieving local authorities of this fiscal burden. But the Provincial 
Government soon found that its responsibility for the judicial system was 
more nominal than real. The Government paid for the staff and the court-
rooms but the judges remained in charge of the flow-or lack of flow-of 
cases through each court. The Government had the responsibility but not 
the control. The challenge was how to discharge this responsibility more 
effectively without destroying judicial independence, a cherished and es-
sential feature of liberal government. 
Ontario, of course, was not alone in facing this challenge. The other 
Canadian provinces, especially the larger and more urbanized ones-
Quebec and British Columbia-began in the 1970's to grapple with the 
same problem. The Canadian situation requires an innovative response as 
constitutional differences preclude the simple importation of American or 
British solutions to the problem. 
The clear principle of the separation of power in the constitution of the 
United States has led to the judicial branch assuming basic responsibility 
for court administration-at both the state and federal levels. Compared 
with the American, the Canadian constitution is more oriented to parlia-
mentary sovereignty and responsible government with all governmental ac-
tivities responsible to the people through the legislature. In Britain in the 
early 1970's, reform was achieved by placing a centralized system of court 
administration under the Lord Chancellor. But the Lord Chancellor's posi-
tion is unique to Great Britain and defies constitutional theory. The Lord 
Chancellor, while a member of the Cabinet and the Legislature (The House 
of Lords), is also a judge and, indeed, head of the British Judiciary. As 
such, he is a figure who traditionally is seen as insulated from partisan poli-
tics. The same aura of independence does not attach to the position of At-
torney-General or Justice Minister in Canadian governments. 
In 1973, Ontario's Law Reform Commission came forward with a so-
lution. Essentially this was a proposal for dual responsibility. A modern, 
thoroughly professional system of court administration would be installed 
under a Provincial director ultimately responsible to the Attorney-General 
but working closely with the judges on a day-to-day basis. But excluded 
from his decision-making authority would be those administrative matters 
which are inextricably bound up with the adjudicative responsibilities of 
judges. These would be left to the judges-and they included the crucial 
functions of assigning cases to judges and judges to courtrooms. There was 
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a reasonable basis for excluding these functions from control by the Execu-
tive. The Government, after all, is the most frequent litigant to appear as a 
party before the courts. If its officials could decide which judges should 
hear the cases in which the government is involved, judicial independence 
in both appearance and reality could be seriously compromised. 
The Ontario Government's first reaction, through the then Attorney 
General, Dalton Bales, was to support the concept of an extensive new sys-
tem of efficient court management but to insist that it must be an integral 
part of the day to day operations of the Attorney General's Department. 
This emphasis seemed to leave little room for judicial participation in court 
administration. The reaction of the Province's bar and bench was predict-
ably hostile. There were signs of a serious constitutional conflict in the 
making. Ontario's senior judges, backed by the legal profession, felt that 
judicial independence was imperilled. The Government seemed up against 
a stone wall in its attempt to discharge its responsibility for providing a 
more efficient judicial service. 
Mr. McMurtry's proposal is a bold and imaginative attempt to break 
this deadlock. It is based, in part, on the shortcomings identified in a recent 
experiment with split responsibilities for court administration in the Hamil-
ton (Central West) area. This experiment demonstrated that so long as 
judges retain control over the assignment of cases, an executive-based 
court administrative office, no matter how well versed in using all the in-
struments of modem management, cannot direct the most critical aspect of 
court business-the flow of cases through the courts. So the lesson was 
learned: a dual approach to court management doesn't work; a unified sys-
tem was required. But under the scheme set out in the White Paper, unified 
control is to be exercised not through Mr. McMurtry's Ministry, nor in-
deed through any other government department, but by a committee of six 
judges-four of whom are appointed by the Federal Government. Govern-
ment policy seems to have turned 180 degrees! 
The transfer of responsibility from the Executive to the Judiciary is 
not complete-as, indeed, it could not be in our system of government. 
Most important, the chief administrative officer under the proposed sys-
tem-the Director of Court Administration-is to be appointed by the Cab-
inet on the advice of the Attorney General, although he would report to the 
Judicial Council and could be removed only upon a Judicial Council rec-
ommendation. The Government also retains control of an important group 
of appointments to minor court offices which are perceived to have consid-
erable patronage value (a dubious part of the proposal in view of the impor-
tant administrative roles played by many such officers). The provincial au-
ditor will inspect the court's accounts. The cabinet and legislature will be 
kept informed by Council reports and an advisory committee established to 
monitor the work of the Judicial Council. And, of course, legislative con-
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trol, including the power to dismantle the Judicial Council, remains with 
the Legislative Assembly. 
A key aspect of the new system is financial control. The annual bud-
get for court expenditures will have to be approved by the legislature. But 
for the first time judges, through the Judicial Council, will supervice the 
preparation of estimates. These will be presented separately to the legisla-
ture, and (although the White Paper does not specify this) might be pre-
sented by the Chief Justice himself. If such a practice of judicial account-
ability to the legislature were to emerge, it would give the public a 
knowledgeable account of the judiciary's resources and needs and yet not 
jeopardize the public's right to an independent judiciary. 
At first glance, it may seem strange for any government to be support-
ing proposals which appear to transfer responsibility to a body over which 
it has little control. But actually, it may be very shrewd. For what the gov-
ernment has now is nominal responsibility without real power. What the 
White Paper entails is a clear ascription of responsibility. The basic respon-
sibility for running the courts, from the highest court in the Province to the 
lowest, is to be ascribed to the judiciary. 
If the proposal goes through, the ball will clearly be in the judiciary' s 
court. The critical question which then arises is will the six senior judges 
who are to constitute the Judicial Council be able any better than the Attor-
ney General to manage the work of Ontario's judges? Assuming that a 
more efficient system of managing the flow of court business and deploy-
ing court resources can be designed, will the Judicial Council be able to en-
sure that there is reasonable compliance by the judges with these plans? 
The answer to this question depends on the extent to which the judges are 
willing to put a sense of corporate responsibility ahead of their own desire 
to run their own court in their own way. If each judge remains more or less 
a master in his own house retaining not only the independence to decide the 
cases which come before him as he sees fit (an independence which, of 
course, he must retain) but also the independence to design his own admin-
istrative practices, his own adjournment policy, and his own standards for 
dispatching business, the new system may end up forcing us to pay too 
high a price for protecting judicial independence. 
The opposite danger is also a possibility. The new system might im-
pose too rigorous a system of central control so that judges are forced to 
sacrifice their professional integrity in order to meet the rigid standards of 
bureaucrats operating only nominally under judicial direction. However, 
so long as judges are in charge, there is perhaps more danger of the sys-
tem's being too insensitive to the needs of the public than to it being insuf-
ficiently sensitive to the concerns of judges. 
There are grounds for being reasonably optimistic about the prospects 
of this new approach to the reform of court administration. By placing the 
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prime responsibility on the judges themselves it removes the threat of exec-
utive interference with the administration of justice and gives supervisory 
control to those who should be best able to define reasonable standards of 
performance in the delivery of adjudicative services. At the same time, it 
leaves open channels of communication and final control, through which 
the public can receive an accounting of judicial performance, and can, in 
the end, insist on changes if that performance, despite increased resources, 
continues to inflict unacceptable hardships on those who use the courts. 
It is to be hoped that the new system, perhaps with some adjustments 
and refinements, will be given a chance. If it is, the rest of Canada and 
much of the common law world will watch closely this path-braking at-
tempt to avoid a collision between the principle of judicial independence 
and the public's need for a reasonably efficient judicial service. 
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